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INTRODUCTION
One unintended by-product of the zealous prosecution of political and ra-
cial militants in the recent past has been the increased participation by social
scientists in the judicial arena. The presence of social psychologists and
sociologists was obvious in the more publicized cases, e.g., the Harrisburg
Eight,1 the Camden 28,2 and the Gainesville Eight.3 Applied social scientists
have also worked in trials involving persons from the right wing of the politi-
cal spectrum, e.g., Mitchell-Stans,4 and in an increasing number of lesser
known criminal cases. Now, at least two organized groups of social scientists,
the National Jury Project and the Raleigh-based Psychology and Law Center,
are permanently established for consultation in both criminal and civil litiga-
tion. In this article we will draw upon our experiences in another of the bet-
ter known trials, that of Ms. Joan Little, to illustrate some of the contributions
of social scientists to the judicial process and to discuss some of the issues
raised by the application of social science to the law.
The Joan Little case began in Washington, North Carolina. Early on the
morning of August 27, 1974, Clarence Alligood, the night jailer for the
Beaufort County jail, was found dead in a locked cell in the women's section
of the jail. Alligood, a sixty-four-year-old white male, had ice pick punctures
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1. United States v, Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. 912 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
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in his body and semen on his leg; and his pants and shoes were outside the
cell. The person incarcerated in the cell during the preceding weeks was Joan
Little, a twenty-year-old black female. Both Ms. Little and the keys to the cell
and jail were missing. Over the next few days, there was an extensive search
for Ms. Little in Beaufort and adjacent counties. She was on the verge of
being declared an outlaw5 when, accompanied by her attorney, Jerry Paul, she
turned herself in to the authorities in Raleigh. She was immediately charged
with first degree murder. On April 28, 1975, her trial was moved from
Beaufort to Wake County (Raleigh), North Carolina. And on August 15, after
a trial of five weeks, she was acquitted of all charges.
The case created an avalanche of publicity. Alligood's death, Little's disap-
pearance, the search for her, and her surrender were covered extensively in
the local, state, and national news media. And because her case touched upon
three currently sensitive political issues-women's rights, racism, and prison
reform-she attracted financial and moral support from a large number of
politically active persons and organizations. Consequently, she was the subject
of many feature articles in the print media and received a great deal of televi-
sion coverage during the interim between her arrest and trial. The trial was
extensively reported by newspapers and television in the United States and
Europe.
The same issues that made her case of interest to political partisans and
the media made it attractive to social scientists as well. Many social scientists
gave freely of their research time and skills during both the pre-trial and trial
phases. Although all of our activities on her behalf attracted some attention,
our presence during the voir dire of prospective jurors attracted the most
attention and controversy. However, our contribution to the grand jury com-
position challenge, and especially to the change of venue motion, was perhaps
more important than the jury selection in determining the outcome of the
trial.
I
THE COMPOSITION CHALLENGE
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the pool of persons from
which grand and petit juries are selected must represent a cross-section of the
community in which the court is situated.6 Because the jury selection system
5. In 1974, North Carolina was one of the few states that still had an outlaw statute. N.C.
GEN. STA'r. § 15-48 (1969). If the Beaufort County Superior Court Judge had declared Ms. Little
an outlaw, then she could have been killed on sight by any citizen without benefit of trial or any
other due process. This statute was declared unconstitutional in late 1976 by Autrey v. Mitchell,
420 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
6. Alexander %. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Turner %'. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Thiel
v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946): Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Strauder v.
West Virginia. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). A more cotiplete discussion of the law on jury composition
challenges may be fotund in Kairys, Juror Selection: The Law, A Mathematical Method of Anavsis, and
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in a given judicial district is presumed representative, the burden of proof
rests upon the litigant challenging the composition. A prima-facie case against
representativeness can be made in four Ways: 1) show bias in the source from
which names are drawn; 2) show bias in the process used to select names; 3)
show that the result of the selection process "substantially" departs from rep-
resentativeness; or 4) show that the procedures for selection violated statutory
standards.7 Demonstrating any one of these four conditions is sufficient to
support a prima-facie case. Social scientists can assist in demonstrating any of
the four, but they can be especially helpful in the first three instances.
For example, it is a well established finding of the voter participation
studies that blacks, women, younger and older people, blue collar workers,
the less educated, and lower income persons are seriously underrepresented
among registered and actual voters relative to their numbers in the general
population.' Hence, social scientists expert in this field of research can testify
that in most jurisdictions any selection process that uses only voter registration
lists or only actual voters will have to start with a biased source. At least one
lower court has ruled that using voter lists as the only source is unconstitu-
tional ' However, although it is a well established canon of statistics that start-
ing with a biased source makes it impossible to produce a representative re-
sult no matter what cosmetics might be applied to make the final results
appear to be so, the thrust of most court decisions has been to allow voting lists
as a source unless it can be shown that the underrepresented "cognizable
classes"'" have been deliberately discouraged or barred from the voter lists."i
Hence, the most important contribution of social scientists to this aspect of
the judicial process so far has been to collect data relative to the results (basis
number three above) of the selection process attempting to show that impor-
tant cognizable classes were indeed "substantially"' 12 underrepresented in the
u Case Study, 10 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 771 (1972); THE JURY SYSTEM: NEW METHODS FOR REDUCING
PREJUDICE (D. Kairys, J. Schulman, & S. Harring eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as D. Kairys].
Though it was not applicable in the Little case, the federal statute contains the phrase "selected at
random from a fair cross section." 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970). If Congress was using the term
"random" in the same way that statisticians and other social scientists use it, this means that a
method of selecting persons for the pool must be used that makes every legally qualified member
of the community equally likely to be drawn. Hence, not just the outcome but the process of
selection is important.
7. D. Kairys 5-24.
8. W. FLANIGAN & N. ZINCALE, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE 9 (3d ed.
1975).
9. People v. Taylor, No. A277-425 (Super. Ct. Cal., filed Oct. 11, 1974).
10. Though social scientists would probably use the term "demographic group," the legal
term is "cognizable class." The concept of cognizable classes includes at least all "economic, social,
religious, racial, political and geographical groups of the community." Thiel v. Southern Pacific
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). For a further discussion, see D. Kairys 10.
t1. D. Kairys 11.
12. Here again, legal and social science terminology is different, though each attempts to deal
with similar concepts. The courts have used the term "substantial disparity," see id. at 14, but have
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resulting grand and/or petit jury pool. The method of gathering these data
and arriving at a statistical decision is conceptually quite simple. The re-
searcher obtains the race, sex, and other demographic characteristics of the
jury pool and compares them with the corresponding characteristics of the
general population as revealed in census or sample survey data for the dis-
trict. However, actually obtaining the data may be quite expensive in terms of
time and money and could tax the patience and ingenuity of the social scien-
tists involved.
In order to mount a grand jury compositional challenge for Joan Little,
we had to engage in the following steps. First, the jury summons lists since
January 1974 were collected from Beaufort County and twenty-two other
counties in eastern North Carolina. These lists served as the basis for both the
compositional and attitudinal surveys (see below) conducted for the trial. A
random sample of 141 individuals was drawn from the jury summons lists of
Beaufort County. These people were contacted by phone, at which time at-
titudinal and demographic information was collected. If the jury summons
lists were unbiased, a random sample drawn from these lists should yield a
sample that reasonably reflected the demographic characteristics of the gen-
eral population. However, if the jury pool were biased, a random sample
from the jury summons lists would reflect whatever biases were present.
The results of the Beaufort County survey are shown in Table I. It is
readily apparent that the jury poo! significantly underrepresented blacks.
While blacks comprise 30.3 per cent of the Beaufort County residents legally
qualified for jury service, only 13.5 per cent showed up in the sample. Thus
blacks are underrepresented by an estimated 16.7 per cent in the jury. If the
jury pool were truly representative of the proportion of eligible blacks in the
county, the chance of our finding this large a difference between the percent-
age of blacks in the sample and the percentage of blacks in the population is
only one out of one thousand.
However, the sample did not indicate that there was any discrimination
against women in the Beaufort County jury pool. As can be seen in Table I,
the composition of the sample was 53.2 per cent women and 46.8 per cent
men. This very closely approximates the composition of the general popula-
tion of 53 per cent women and 47 per cent men.
While we were able to show a significant underrepresention of blacks in
not spelled out exactly at what point a substantial disparity exists between the proportion of a
cognizable class in the jury pool and in the general population. As of now, a substantial disparity
exists only when a judge believes it to exist. The social science or statistical term is "significant"
and refers to the point where the difference is large enough that such a disparity could have
occurred by chance less than five times in one hundred if the sample (in this case the jury pool)
had been in fact drawn fairly. See, e.g. W. HAYS, STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 334 (2d ed.
1973); McConahay, Experimental Research, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 356, 370 (J.
Knutson ed. 1973).
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TABLE I
PROPORTIONS OF BLACKS AND WOMEN LEGALLY QUALIFIED
FOR JURY SERVICE IN THE GENERAL POPULATION OF
BEAUFORT COUNTY AND IN THE JURY POOL SAMPLE
RACE SEX
Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent
White Black Male Female
General 69.7% 30.3% 47% 53%
Population
Jury 86.5% (122) 13.5% (19) 46.8% (66) 53.2% (75)
Pool
Numbers in parentheses represent actual occurrence in sample.
the Beaufort County jury pool, the court denied our motion to quash the bill
of indictment. Our efforts to obtain a change of venue were more successful.
II
CHANGE OF VENUE MOTION
When a case has received publicity which would make it extremely dif-
ficult to impanel a fair jury or when the issues surrounding the case arouse
the racial, political, sexual, or other prejudices of a large segment of the
population of the judicial district, a change of venue is one means of increas-
ing the likelihood that the defendant will receive a fair trial. The usual
grounds for a change of venue motion are prejudicial publicity or prejudicial
attitudes toward the client in the district.
Social scientists who are authorities in communications research and public
opinion have been called upon to testify that the evidence presented indicates
that prejudice against the defendant is so high that a fair and impartial jury
cannot be impaneled in that district.
The evidence presented may vary from copies of newspaper clippings and
government press releases to affidavits from people in the community, 3 but
the best evidence from the standpoint of the social scientist is data from care-
fully conducted public opinion polls. To have scientific validity, these polls
must have at least two features: 1) they must be based upon a random sample
of persons in the judicial districts, and 2) at least two judicial districts must be
polled.
13. D. Kairys 43.
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A random sample is important because it is the only procedure that insures
that the resulting sample will be representative of the population within speci-
fiable limits of confidence, 14 and it permits the social scientist to conduct valid
tests of statistical significance. 15 Other types of samples (quota, convenience,
bellweather, informed observers, and so on) do not meet these criteria and
are not valid no matter how loudly they may be proclaimed to be so. Random
samples are not haphazard. Whether they are based upon telephone or face-
to-face interviews, they are drawn by exact and careful procedures that utilize
a chance medium to insure that every member of the relevant population is
equally likely to be drawn. For that reason, they are expensive and require a
great deal of expertise.
A minimum of two districts must be polled for two reasons. First, social
science judgments are relative or comparative. Except at the extremes (i.e., 99
per cent of the potential jurors in this district think the defendant is guilty),
comparison with some abstract or absolute standard is either impossible or
meaningless as far as the social scientist is concerned. Second, and more im-
portant, without at least one comparison district, there is no guarantee that
moving the trial will reduce the level of prejudice against the defendant. The
new district might have a significantly higher level of prejudice than the
original.
One final general point about public opinion polls: The size of the sample has
no effect upon its representativeness. Samples of one hundred or one hundred
thousand drawn by non-random methods are equally unrepresentative. A
random sample of fifty is superior to a non-random sample of five hundred
from the standpoint of representativeness. Sample size affects the accuracy of
the estimates of opinions and the likelihood of finding a significant difference be-
tween two samples, but it is the method by which it is drawn and not its size
that determines a sample's representativeness. 16
It is our opinion that the most important thing we did to insure a fair trial
and an acquittal for Joan Little was to present evidence and testimony that
secured a change of venue for her trial.
The North Carolina statutes regarding a change of venue permit the trial
judge to move a trial from its original county to a contiguous county if, in the
opinion of the trial judge, a fair and impartial jury cannot be impaneled in
the original county.17 If he or she has doubts that a fair jury can be impan-
eled in a contiguous county, the judge may, at his or her discretion, remove
the trial to another county in a contiguous judicial district.' 8 Thus, accord-
14. L. KisHt, SURVEY SAMPLING 148-181 (1965).
15. McConahay, supra note 12, at 373.
16. L. KisH, supra note 14; McConahay supra note 12, at 369.
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-84 (1969).
18. N.C GEN. STAT. § 15A-957 (1969).
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ing to the statutes, it was theoretically possible for the trial judge to remove
Joan Little's trial to any one of twenty-three counties within the area gener-
ally known as the eastern region of North Carolina. It was the defense's posi-
tion, however, that the cultural and ethnic homogeneity of the whites in the re-
gion created a commonly held value structure that made it impossible for Ms.
Little to receive a fair trial in any one of these eastern counties.
In all of these counties agriculture is the primary source of income, the
population is spread relatively sparsely across the land, and there has been
little in or out migration among whites during this century. Hence, we could
expect a great deal of intergenerational continuity in political and value
socialization to produce a high degree of conservatism in the white people of
the region."9 We expected the conservatism of the whites (whom our surveys
revealed to be overrepresented in all of the jury pools in the counties of the
region) to be reflected in their commonly held, stereotypical attitudes towards
race, towards women, towards those in authority, towards women who have
been raped, and towards capital punishment. All of these attitudes could
strongly influence the final decision of those who would judge Joan Little.
Though we were prepared to argue for a change of venue, county by
county for each of the twenty-three eastern counties, Judge McKinnon ruled
that he would allow a change of venue from Beaufort County, the indicting
county, to Pitt County. He agreed with us that there would be little chance of
securing a fair and impartial jury in Beaufort and he felt that Pitt had more
adequate courtroom facilities as well as a larger police force to deal with the
expected demonstrators. All other eastern counties were ruled out of consid-
eration.
The defense then tried to convince Judge McKinnon that a move to Pitt
would not improve Ms. Little's chances of getting a fair jury. In order to do
that, it would be necessary to move to the more urban Piedmont area of the
state. To substantiate our argument, we presented data from the random
sample telephone surveys we had conducted in each of the twenty-three coun-
ties of the eastern region and in one Piedmont county, Orange. The results
from Beaufort, Pitt, and Orange Counties for the exposure, preconception of
guilt, and racism questions in our survey are shown in Table II.
These data show that there were no differences among the counties in the
respondents' perceived level of exposure to the case. Over 75 per cent of
those surveyed in these (and the other twenty-two) counties said that they had
heard "a lot" about the case. The data also show that though Pitt and Beau-
fort did not differ significantly from one another in preconceptions of guilt
19. For a discussion of the role of population density and regional migration in political and
value socialization and a review of the relevant literature, see D. SEARS & J. MCCONAHAY, THE
POLITICS OF VIOLENCE 34-54 (1973); R. ASHMORE & J. MCCONAHAY, PSYCHOLOGY AND AMERICA'S
URBAN DILEMMAS 107-24 (1975).
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TABLE II
RESPONSES TO SURVEY ITEMS BY COUNTY FOR
BEAUFORT, PITT, AND ORANGE COUNTIES, NORTH CAROLINA
Question County
Beaufort Pitt Orange
(N= 158) (N= 135) (N= 157)
Exposure
"How much have you heard about this
case?"
(per cent saying "a lot") 76 76 78
Preconception of Guilt
"Do you believe that Joan Little killed Clar-
ence Alligood in self defense?"
(per cent saying "No") 38 36 18
Racism
1) "Do you believe that black women have
lower morals than white women-"
2) "Do you believe that black people are
more violent than white people?"
(per cent saying "yes" to both items) 63 64 35
Entries are the percent of a county giving the indicated response. For example 76 per cent of
the respondents in Beaufort County said they had heard "a lot" about the case.
and racial attitudes,21 they did differ significantly from Orange County.2
Hence, we argued that, while a move to Pitt would gain nothing, a move to
Orange would make it much more likely that a fair and impartial jury could
be impaneled.
We further substantiated our case by introducing evidence developed by
academic experts working independently of the defense team. We introduced
a survey by the University of North Carolina showing results Very similar to
ours. Dr. Paul Brandis, also of the University of North Carolina and an au-
thority on the effects of publicity upon attitudes, introduced a content analysis
showing that newspaper coverage in the eastern region would induce prej-
udice. This was buttressed by introducing all newspaper clippings about the
Little case from newspapers in the region.
20. All probabilities were greater than twenty in one hundred and hence not statistically sig-
nificant. See note 12 supra.
21. All probabilities were much less than one in one thousand and hence were statistically
significant. Id.
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Expert testimony was also given by Professor Robin Williams of Cornell
University who indicated for the court the "resonating effects" which could be
expected to occur in a community such as the eastern region of North Caro-
lina. Williams explained that in such areas there exists a societal standard coin-
monly held by the people of the region. Word-of-mouth information
dispersal is the primary method by which people become aware of events oc-
curring within their communities. In the case of unusual events that break
with the general standards, this procedure serves as a tool to indicate to all
inhabitants of the community how people "should" feel about this incident.
Finally, the defense introduced one hundred two affidavits or statements
from persons in Pitt County which stated that most people in the county had
already formed an opinion about the case.
We convinced Judge McKinnon. Although he did not move the trial to
Orange County, where the University of North Carolina has its main campus,
he did move it to Wake County, which is also in the Piedmont region and is
the location of Raleigh, the state's capitol and one of its largest cities.
When he made the oral announcement of his change of venue decision,
Judge McKinnon spoke of the high level of racism which was apparent to him
in Pitt County. However, his written order did not mention racism. He based
his written decision on the substantial amount of publicity the case had re-
ceived in the Pitt County news media and the fact that, as a result, many
people had fixed opinions about the case. Hence, he feared that an exces-
sively large number of potential jurors would have to be called for exami-
nation.
IiI
JURY SELECTION
The voir dire, or jury selection process, varies across jurisdictions in the
United States. In most federal courts, potential jurors are interviewed by the
judge, who asks questions submitted to him or her by the prosecution and
defense along with his or her own questions. In most state and local courts,
the voir dire is conducted with groups of potential jurors. The prosecution,
the defense, and the judge ask their own questions of the jurors as a group
and of individual jurors in the presence of the other jurors. Less frequently,
the individual potential juror is interviewed out of the sight and hearing of
the other potential jurors. 22
In the trial of Joan Little, the judge asked potential jurors, in groups of
twelve, general questions-largely regarding their ability to serve for the ex-
pected four- to six-week period. Then they were examined individually out of
the sight and hearing of other jurors. The prosecution questioned them first
22. For a more complete discussion of voir dire formats, see D. Kairys 25-30.
Page 205: Winter 1977]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
and, if they were not excused for cause, made a decision to accept or peremp-
torily challenge the juror. Once it had passed a juror, the prosectuion could
not change its decision. At this point, the potential juror was examined by the
defense and, if the person was not excused for cause, the defense had to
decide to accept or use one of its peremptory challenges. If the defense ac-
cepted a juror, he or she was immediately sequestered in the jury room. This
process continued until sixteen jurors (twelve regular jurors and four alter-
nates) were seated. The process of jury selection took ten working days dur-
ing which over two hundred potential jurors were interviewed.
Six streams of data were combined in the defense's decision to accept or
reject a potential juror. First, on the basis of a random sample survey of Wake
County, 3 we had developed a mathematical model of the juror who would be
ideal for the defense. Second, we observed the behavior of the potential juror
during the voir dire and rated him or her on a psychological characteristic
known as authoritarianism. 24 Third, we observed the "body language" includ-
ing both kinesic and paralinguistic behavior in order to determine the degree
to which a potential juror was defense or prosecution oriented.25 Fourth, the
attorneys2 drew upon their voir dire experience and common sense. Fifth,
we had a psychic 2 7 who observed the potential jurors and advised us of their
aura, "karma," and psychic vibrations. Finally, Ms. Little was asked how she
felt about any juror whom we were seriously considering accepting.
We shall go into more detail on the first three of these in the next few
sections of this article. It is beyond the scope of our task here to make any
comments upon the judgments of the attorneys, the psychic, or Ms. Little
except to note three observations. First, all streams of data pointed to the
same decision in about 90 per cent of the cases. Second, when there was
disagreement, a majority of the lawyers and Ms. Little usually went with the
decision indicated by the scientific evidence. Finally, given the political nature
of the trial, the publicity value of a psychic should not be underestimated. He
helped to keep the eyes of the world upon the defense, the prosecution, the
judge, and Raleigh, North Carolina.
A. The Survey and Mathematical Model
Although it was expensive to construct (about $35 thousand), the most
important scientific tool we had was the mathematical model of the defense's
23. Jeffrey Frederick was in charge of the calculations based upon the mathematical model.
He was ably assisted in the courtroom by Diane Ford Krowe and Barbara Heokje.
24. Courtroom observations of authoritarianism were conducted by Richard Christie, John
McConahay, and Georgina Hancock.
25. David Suggs and Courtney J. Mullin conducted most of the body language observations.
26. Chief defense counsels were Jerry Paul and Karen Galloway. They were assisted by Morris
Dees, Marvin Miller, James Rowan, and Milton Williamson.
27. The psychic was Richard.
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ideal juror based upon a random sample survey of Wake County. Its effec-
tiveness rested upon two assumptions which, fortunately, proved to be jus-
tified. First, we assumed that the jury pool would be close to a random sample
of the citizens of Wake County eligible for jury service. Second, we assumed
that those characteristics of the survey respondents which enabled us to pre-
dict opinions regarding Joan Little's guilt or innocence in the sample survey
would also enable us to predict them in the jury pool.
In order to facilitate a general understanding of the mathematical model
by readers unfamiliar with statistical methods, it will be described in a brief,
nontechnical fashion. The basic idea behind this approach is that individuals
who are predisposed to believe that the defendant in question is guilty will
differ from other individuals with respect to a number of observable charac-
teristics. Once these characteristics have been identified for the population as
a whole, they can be used to predict the predispositions of each potential
Juror.
Before the model can be employed, a survey of attitudes in the particular
geographical area of interest must be undertaken. This provides an assess-
ment of the attitudinal composition of that area from which the mathematical
model will then generate its predictions. The mathematical model itself is a
predictive hybrid of several statistical techniques. First, we chose an appro-
priate measure of the attitudes or opinions we wished to predict, i.e., belief in
the guilt or innocence of the accused. Next, a series of statistical techniques
was employed to determine what demographic characteristics of the respon-
dents in the sample would act as predictors of these important opinions. De-
mographic characteristics might include age, race, sex, political and religious
affiliations.
In the first phase of the procedure, an attempt was made to divide the
sample into groups possessing similar opinions. That is, if those of higher
ages and lower ages differed in their opinions regarding the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused, it would be helpful to divide the sample into younger
and older age groups before an attempt was made to formulate predictions of
their important opinions. This was accomplished by using a modified version
of a statistical computer program known as AID (Automatic Interaction De-
tection).
The AID program searched the survey data until it had successfully di-
vided the sample into as many groups as possible based upon the homoge-
neity of the sample members' opinions. Membership in any one homoge-
neous group was often defined by several demographic characteristics-for
example, young democrats with at least a college education. As a result of
this first phase, our ability to predict opinions was increased by decreasing
the variability of our sample.
After the sample was divided into groups of individuals with fairly similar
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opinions, each group was examined to establish which of their social and
psychological characteristics were important with respect to our abillity to
predict a potential juror's opinions. In more technical terms, this phase was
concerned with the formulation of predictive equations for jurors' opinions.
In order to do this, we used a technique known as multiple regression, which
enabled us to develop a mathematical model of the opinions of potential
jurors based upon a series of characteristics that differed from one demo-
graphic group to another. An example of this would be the case where one
group produced by phase I consisted of young democrats with at least a col-
lege education. For members of this group we may need to know the sex,
religious attitudes, and income characteristics of the individuals. In another
group from phase I, e.g., democrats over forty-five years old with a high
school education, the terms in the predictive equation might be the type of
magazines read, sex, and preferred presidential candidate.
Though the social and psychological factors used to predict opinions var-
ied from group to group, they combined to form the same thing: a prediction
of the likelihood that a potential juror would be willing to vote Joan Little not
guilty before hearing any of the evidence.
One of the advantages of this procedure is obvious. Regardless of what a
juror might say during the voir dire, by observing or obtaining his or her
demographic characteristics (age, education, etc.) and social-psychological char-
acteristics (politics, reading habits, etc.), the mathematical model enabled us to
predict how predisposed he or she was to side with the prosecution or de-
fense. Potential jurors might lie about their preconceptions of guilt or inno-
cence, but they were much less likely to lie about their age or education.
A second advantage is not so obvious. Because'the judge permitted both
prosecution and defense to send out with the jury summons a questionnaire
concerning the jurors' demographic characteristics, 8 we were able to get a
preliminary estimate of what proportion of the jury pool would be predis-
posed to be "pro-defense" or "pro-defendant" before the voir dire began and
before we had seen a single juror. The advantage here is that in the early
part of the voir dire we could afford to let some promising jurors go because
we knew that better potential jurors would appear later. Many of the news
reporters failed to see how important this was. Informally, if not in print or
on the air, they expressed the opinion that the mathematical model and the
other scientific procedures were not necessary because anyone would have
known we wanted health food waitresses (the final jury had two of them) and
a former drama major turned record store manager. What they failed to
28. The questionnaire sent to jurors with their summons did not, of course, have any ques-
tions about the impending trial, about their attitudes toward Ms. Little, nor about their precon-
ceptions of her guilt or innocence.
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notice was that we got these persons as jurors because we had not already
filled the slots with secretaries and IBM engineers.
B. Authoritarianism
Although we expected the math model to be between 85 per cent and 95
per cent accurate, we supplemented it with courtroom observations of au-
thoritarianism and body language. Our observations of authoritarianism were
based upon the theory of the authoritarian personality developed in the 1950s
by researchers at the University of California at Berkeley. 29
According to this theory, which is supported by mountains of empirical
research, 3 " extreme authoritarians are rigid, racist, anti-semitic, sexually re-
pressed, politically conservative, highly punitive individuals who will accept
the word of an authority figure over that of a lesser person. The author-
itarian is servile and obsequious in a subordinate position, but takes out
all of his or her pent-up hostility and frustration upon those perceived to be
in violation of the conventional norms of society.3 1
It is obvious that no defense attorney would want a jury loaded with ex-
treme authoritarians. However, people vary in the degree to which they ex-
hibit authoritarian personality traits. To the extent that potential jurors are
more or less authoritarian, we would expect them to be more or less desirable
from the viewpoint of the defense as jurors in trials involving minority per-
sons, political and social nonconformists, or other controversial defendants. It
is possible that the juror's level of authoritarianism might be something of a
factor in all criminal trials. In the adversary system, the juror must weigh the
evidence and arguments presented by the prosecution on behalf of the state
or society and by the defense attorney on behalf of someone accused of a
crime and therefore of lower status then the prosecutor.
The procedure for observing prospective jurors and rating their level of
authoritarianism was developed by Richard Christie for use in the Harrisburg
Eight trial. Christie had refined the procedure in a number of subsequent
criminal trials, and in fact he was present at the Little trial to observe the
potential jurors and to train others in the use of his observation and rating
technique.
29. 1. ADORNO, E. FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK, D. LEVINSON, & R. SANFORD, THE AUTHORITARIAN
PERSONALITY (1950).
30. The most complete critical summary of the theory and empirical research testing the
theory of the authoritarian personality may be found in R. BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 477-546
(1965).
31. The hypothesized psychodynamic origins of the authoritarian personality syndrome are
highly controversial in academic psychology. R. BROWN, supro note 30. However, we did not need
to dig into the psychological history of prospective jurors in order to rate their authoritarianism.
If they exhibited authoritarian behavior during the voir dire, we rated them as authoritarian
regardless of how they got that way.
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The authoritarianism rating scale we used in the courtroom ranged from a
low of zero which represented minimum authoritarianism to a high of thirty
which represented maximum authoritarianism. The neutral point between
high authoritarian and low authoritarian behavior was fifteen. Christie's ex-
perience in a number of trials suggested that the average American rated
about twenty on this scale of authoritarianism. By observing the authoritar-
ianism-related behavior of potential jurors-their rigidity, their sexual prud-
ery, their introspectiveness, and so on-three social psychologists were able
to rate reliably the person's level of authoritarianism. When a decision was
made to accept or reject a potential juror, these independently made, written
ratings were combined to feed an authoritarianism rating into the decision
making process. 2
The average rating assigned by our observers to all persons who were
interviewed for Ms. Little's jury was 21.02, which is not very different from
the general American population. On the other hand, the average for the
sixteen seated jurors was 14.03. For the twelve who made the final decision to
acquit her, the average authoritarianism rating was 12.95. Thus, we wvere able
to pick a jury which was significantly less authoritarian than the jury pool as a
whole.
C. Body Language
In a highly publicized case such as Ms. Little's, there were some people
who actively desired to be on the jury. These people might have said what-
ever was necessary to insure that they were picked for the jury. Some of them
could be expected to be pro-defense, some to be pro-prosecution. It was cru-
cial for the defense to determine in some way the truthfulness of the jurors
being selected. To do this, we called upon the newly emerging science of
kinesics and paralinguistics, i.e. body language.
Although people frequently communicate their true feelings in the words
the), speak, it is now clear that we can also communicate a great deal of in-
formation by means of our body movements, gestures, positions, vocal intona-
tions, pauses and the like. In other words, it is not what we say but the way
we say it. We are perfectly capable of expressing one type of attitude with our
language and a diametrically opposed attitude with our body language, for
example, by unduly long pauses when speaking or by loudness or softness of
the voice.
Our approach was to measure the levels of anxiety expressed by the indi-
32. The average interrater reliability of our ratings was .84, and our courtroom authoritarian-
ism ratings correlated .82 with a verbal scale of authoritarianism administered by our interviewer
both to the jurors who served in the trial and to a sample of potential jurors whom we rejected.
Hence, we had highly satisfactory levels of reliability and validity by these measures. For an
elementary discussion of measures of reliability and validity, see McConahay, supra note 12,
at 364.
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viduals being questioned. We employed five variables to determine the kinesic
response (body movement, body orientation, body posture, eye contact, and
hand movement). We also employed two paralinguistic measures (vocal into-
nation and vocal hesitancy).
No single kinesic or paralinguistic response determined the acceptance or
rejection of any juror. We were looking for patterns of behavior. Human
communication is extremely complex and one must look at the whole in order
to make any determination as to the attitudes being expressed. Some popular
writers on the subject would have one believe that a single gesture is indica-
tive of an overall attitude."3 In truth, the single gesture must be deeply incor-
porated into a pattern of response expressed throughout the body and by the
voice.1
4
David Suggs, of the University of Nebraska, was our expert on body lan-
guage. He and one and sometimes two other observers trained by him noted
each prospective juror's pattern of kinesic and paralinguistic behavior (de-
scribed above) and rated the juror on a scale ranging from one point, least
favorable to the defense, to five points, most favorable to the defense. These
preliminary ratings were w. ritten down independently by each observer and
then combined to form a final five point rating of the juror's attitude toward
the defense (a high score indicating maximum favorableness).
To assess the relationship between the measures made on the basis of au-
thoritarianism and body language, we correlated the two scales. The overall
correlation was -.79. This correlation was high and indicated that authoritar-
ianism was associated with being least favorable toward the defense. The cor-
relation was not so high, however, as to indicate that the two scales were
simply measuring the same phenomena. Each measure both reinforced and
added to the other. The use of both approaches insured more complete
knowledge of the attitudes of the potential jurors than the use of either alone.
D. The Final Decision
When, in the course of the voir dire, a member of the defense team
thought that a decision should be made on the potential juror under consid-
eration, a conference was called. At this point, the members of the team put
their heads together in a fashion that resembled a football huddle. Each social
scientist read to the team from a written estimate of the potential juror based
upon the juror's demographic rating, authoritarianism, or body language. In
this way we minimized the influence upon an estimate from one technique
(e.g., body language) by another technique (e. g., authoritarianism). The attor-
neys, the psychic, and Ms. Little also indicated their opinions of the potential
33. Katz, The Twelve-man Jury, 5 TRIAL iDo. 1, at 39-42 (1968-69). See also J. FAST, BODY
LANGUAGE (1973).
34. A. E. SCHEFLEN & A. SCHEFLEN, BODY LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL ORDER (1972).
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juror in this "huddle." One of three decisions was made: accept, reject, or
obtain more information.
If the decision was to accept, we either indicated acceptance at that time or
asked a few more "soft" questions in order to educate the juror and establish
further rapport. If the decision was to reject, we began a line of questioning
which attempted to get the potential juror excused for cause.3 5 The defense
team was very successful at getting people whom we did not want excused by
the judge for cause. By the time we were choosing the twelfth juror, we had
thirteen of our original fourteen peremptory challenges left while the pros-
ecution had expended eight of its original nine peremptories.
When there were disagreements among the members of the team about a
given juror, we continued to obtain information by asking more informational
questions until we could reach agreement to accept or reject. As indicated
above, when we had sufficient information, the scientific evidence pointed
toward the same decision in over 90 per cent of the cases. Furthermore, as
our advantage over the prosecution in peremptory challenges increased, we
became more and more cautious about whom we accepted so that if only one
of the streams of scientific data suggested a rejection, we rejected. This meant
that we were virtually unanimous about the sixteen jurors finally accepted.
At the close of the five week trial, the jury took seventy-eight minutes to
find Ms. Little not guilty of all charges.
IV
ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES
Reactions to the incursion of social scientists into the judicial system have
been mixed but not quiet. A distinguished professor of law heartily congratu-
lated us for doing "what every trial lawyer tries to do: stack the jury." An
equally distinguished professor of psychology berated one of the authors for
over half an hour for subverting justice by "stacking the jury." Another social
scientist, Amitai Etzioni, has compared the application of social science to jury
selection with Adam's legendary nibble from the apple that got our forebear-
ers banished from paradise.3 6 Other commentators, pro and con, have been
35. The most obvious way to get prospective jurors excused for cause was to get them to say
in court that their minds were so made up beforehand that they could not set their prior opin-
ions aside and decide the case only on the basis of the evidence they encountered during the
trial. However, we were also able to excuse for cause a number of other prospective jurors who
said they would let the fact that Ms. Little did not take the stand influence their decision and/or
who said that they would hold it against her if she did not put forward any evidence in her
defense. Both of these rights are guaranteed to defendants by the United States Constitution.
The prosecution also had a favorite method of getting prospective jurors excused for cause;
opposition to the death penalty. In fact, thirty-seven of the first thirty-eight blacks who were
interviewed as prospective jurors said that they were opposed in principle to the death penalty.
Not all of them, however, were so opposed that they had to be excused for cause.
36. Etzioni, Creating an Imbalance, 10 TRIAL no. 6, at 28 (1974).
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equally excited and agitated about what has happened.a7
It is scientific jury selection that has aroused the controversy. Our efforts
to challenge the jury pool composition and to seek a change of venue went
generally unnoticed. We hypothesize that this occurred in part because the
procedures do not appear very "sexy" to those knowledgeable in statistics, and
in part because they are viewed by social scientists as making the system more
just. If the law says juries must represent a cross-section of the population,
then making jury pools more representative helps to reform the judicial sys-
tem. Changing the venue is probably viewed similarly, with the added bonus
that it can save tax dollars by avoiding a situation where a trial must be
moved because an impartial jury cannot be impaneled after days or weeks of
voir dire. Therefore, since it is scientific jury selection that arouses the con-
troversy, we shall limit our discussion to this aspect.3 8
Now that we have been involved in the Little trial and a number of others,
it is our opinion that two issues must be faced before we address ethical or
policy questions. First is the context in which social science is being applied:
the American adversary system of justice in theory and as it really exists. Sec-
ond is the question of the efficacy of scientific jury selection. Does it really
make a difference in the outcome of trials?
A. The Adversary System
The intensity of condemnation of scientifc jury selection is, generally, in-
versely proportional to the critic's knowledge of and experience with the
American adversary system of justice. Therefore, at the risk of offending our
readers who are familiar with the system, we shall give a brief, elementary
summary of the philosophy that guides our system.
The American legal system, at least, is based upon an adversary model of
procedural justice.3 9 It is assumed, at least in theory, that justice will emerge
37. Very personal communications to the three authors.
38. In a few instances a criticism of any involvement of social scientists as advocates in an
adversary process has been voiced. The basis of the criticism is that such involvement threatens
the "objectivity" of social science and social scientists, and hence reduces our credibility in the
world at large. Though it is most often voiced by graduate students, this notion of objectivity as
neutrality sounds quaint given the current understanding of these terms by most active social
science researchers. For elementary discussions of these points from the standpoint of modern
social science researchers, see D, SEARS & J. MCCONAHAY, supra note 19, at viii-ix; R. ASHMORE &
J. MCCONAHAY, supra note 19, at 1-11; 144-156. Such criticisms also ignore the fact that objectiv-
ity or neutrality in this sense is simply to give support to the status quo or to the forces with the
most power. At any rate, the issue is one that is more appropriate for discussion within the social
science guild rather than in an interdisciplinary journal.
39. Procedural justice refers to the procedures for settling disputes or determining guilt or
innocence. This form of justice should be distinguished from "distributive" justice which refers to
the just allocation of outcomes and resources. For an elementary discussion of the distinction
between distributive and procedural justice, see J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:
A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 3 (1975). For a social psychological analysis of distributive justice, see
Adams, Inequitv in Social Exchange, in 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267 (L.
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from contending sides (prosecution and defense, plaintiff and defendant)
possessing equal resources, doing their best to present the strongest possible
case, or to look after the interests of clients in the strongest possible way."' In
the adversary system, the decision maker is a third party, the judge and/or
jury. This third party is supposed to remain neutral and render the decision
after hearing both cases made by the contending advocates. In criminal cases,
there is one additional rule that the decision maker is supposed to follow. The
defendant is presumed innocent until guilt is established beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Other legal systems depart from this basic procedural theory in critical
ways.41 The prosecutor and decision maker may be the same person, or the
fact finder may combine both the prosecutorial and defense attorney roles, or
the defendant may be required to prove his or her innocence rather than
being presumed innocent with the burden of proof falling upon the prosecu-
tion. But in the American system, the three roles (prosecution, defense, and
decision maker) are kept distinct. As a consequence, if someone wishes to
introduce certain skills or knowledge into the adversary system and that per-
son does not happen to be a judge or juror, the usual way is to enter on
behalf of one of the adversaries.
Empirical research by John W. Thibaut and Laurens Walker 42 demon-
strated that when the assumptions of the various procedural justice systems
are met, the adversary system has the following advantages over other sys-
tems, particularly the inquisitorial system used in most European countries.
First, more facts emerge, presumably leading to a "truer" picture of what
actually happened. Second, the "right" outcome, an outcome most congruent
with the facts and with notions of distributive justice, is more likely to occur.
Third, both the parties winning and losing the dispute are more likely to feel
that the procedure is fair. That is, the adversary system has greater perceived
justice. Finally, potential litigants, even the Europeans, prefer the adversary
system before they know which side they will be on and how strong their case
will be. Hence, it appears that, in theory at least, the adversary system is
superior to other systems of procedural justice. 43
However, the American adversary legal system as it actually exists departs
BERKOWITZ ed. 1965). For a philosophical discussion of lis ributive and pr ocedur al justice, see J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
40. There are, of course, restrictions on what the advocates can do in pursuing their clients'
interests. They cannot, for example. stIborn perjur' or tamper with evidence. See J. THIBAUT &
L. WALKER, supa note 39, at 29.
41. Id. at 22-27.
42. Id. That is What the whole book is about.
43. Not everyone would agree that Thibaut and Walker clearly demonstrated the superiority
of the adversary systent, especially in criminal trials. See Vidtuar, Choosiig, Finding, and Evahiting
Methods of Obtaining Legal justice, 21 CONTEMP. PSYCH. 773 (1976).
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in a number of important ways from the theoretical model. 44 One key as-
sumption of the model is equal resources for the adversaries. Observers,
though, generally agree that in practice that is not the case. While Etzioni
feels that scientific jury selection has tipped the balance of resources in favor
of the defendants, or at least those defendants who have political or financial
resources, 45 Howard A. Moore, Jr., an attorney who has defended Angela
Davis and other radicals, asserts that when minority group members or politi-
cal nonconformists are on trial the general population's high level of prej-
udice gives the prosecution a built-in advantage. 46 Other critics of the existing
system perceive that in most criminal trials the state has much greater re-
sources to investigate both the case and potential jurors. 47
A second critical assumption of the adversary model is that the juror, or
other decision maker, understands the concept of presumption of innocence
and is willing to apply it, can set aside his or her emotions and prior knowl-
edge, and can render a decision based solely on the admissible evidence while
properly applying the reasonable doubt standard. These traits and skills are
even rare among scholars and scientists who have been trained to acquire
them at great expense and over years of time. Consequently, in the current
American system we have to use mortals who fall short of the ideal.
These weaknesses of the average juror and the pressures of the adversary
system lead contending teams of lawyers to seek jurors who favor their client.
If they cannot find such people, then lawyers will usually settle for persons
who are reasonably fair-minded.
Since the first lawyer defended the first client before a jury in an adver-
sary process, lawyers have used intuition, rules of thumb, and folk psychology
and sociology to guide them in choosing jurors. Clarence Darrow's prescrip-
tion for selecting juries favorable to the underdog clients whom he frequently
represented was to reject prohibitionists, Presbyterians, Baptists, Scandina-
vians, and the well-to-do, while accepting Jews, agnostics, Irishmen and espe-
cially looking for those who liked to laugh. 48
In the Little trial, the adversary system worked fairly well with respect to
the jury's level of authoritarianism. We rejected the extremely high ones and
44. For a review of empirical studies and critiques of the actual criminal justice system in
America, see R. ASHMORE & J. MCCONAHAY, supra note 19, at 87-106.
45. Etzioni, supra note 36.
46. Moore, Redressing the Balance. 10 TRIAL no. 6, at 29, 31. 35 (1974).
47. J. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE 77 (1972). See also
R. ASHMORE & J. MCCONAHAY, su1pra note 19, at 96-101. It has been alleged that the federal
government used the resources of the FBI and other agencies to investigate and interview pro-
spective jurors in their homes. See D. Kairys, supra note 6. This is potentially much more effec-
tive for selecting the right jurors than mathematical models of courtroom observations.
48. Kahn. Picking Peers: Social Scientists' Role in Selection f/juries Sparks Legal Debate, Wall St. J.
Aug. 12, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
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the prosecution eliminated the extremely low. As a result, while individual
members of the jury varied in their authoritarianism, the jury as a whole was
very close to the neutral point. 49 Hence, the overall jury was not particularly
biased either way.
An even less authoritarian jury might have been better from the stand-
point of the theoretically ideal juror. According to experimental research by
Mitchell and Byrne, such legally irrelevant factors as the defendant's attrac-
tiveness and similarity to the juror bias the decisions of high authoritarians,
but low authoritarians are more likely to decide on the basis of the facts
presented.50
B. Does it Work?
Etzioni believes that scientific jury selection is effective and that it should
be banned because it gives one side an unfair advantage.5 1 In an article in
Psychology Today, Michael Saks has asserted that scientific jury selection does
not work and that we should forget about the whole thing.5 2 Saks's argument
was rather weak because the studies he cited were mostly his own unpublished
work and he did not describe his methodology in sufficient detail to enable us
to evaluate the validity of his findings. Nevertheless, the question he raised is
crucial. If scientific jury selection does not have an appreciable effect upon a
trial's outcome, then the controversy over its use should revolve around issues
of fraud and not jury stacking.
We believe that our efforts made a difference in the outcome of the Little
trial, but because there was no control group,53 we can never be certain in the
scientific sense. Judge Hamilton Hobgood called the case presented against
Ms. Little one of the weakest he had seen in more than twenty years on the
bench. 54 It is possible that any jury would have found her not guilty. Fur-
thermore, even if scientific jury selection did produce an acquittal, it might
have been for the wrong reasons. We can think of three other hypotheses to
account for the results in addition to the notion that we chose jurors with
appropriate psychological and social backgrounds.
49. See text at p. 220 supra.
50. Mitchell & Byrne, The Defendant's Dilemma: Effects of Jurors' Attitudes and Authoritarianism on
Judicial Decisons, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 123 (1973).
51. Etzioni, supra note 36.
52. Saks, Social Scientists Can't RigJuries, 9 PSYCH. TODAY no. 8, at 48 (1976).
53. In experimental design, a control group is one that is like the experimental group in
every way except that it did not receive the experimental treatment. In this case, the experimen-
tal group would be a set of trials in which scientific jury selection was used and the control group
would be a set of trials equal in every way (through randomization) to the trials in the experimen-
tal group. Any difference between the outcome of the trials with scientific jury selection and
those without could be attributed only to the use of scientific jury selection rather than to other
factors such as differences in evidence, jurisdiction, judges, and so on. See McConahay, supra
note 12, for an elementary discussion of experimental designs for nonlaboratory research.
54. Wake Jury Acquits Joan Little, Says State Didn't Prove Its Case, Raleigh News & Observer, Aug.
16, 1975, at 1, col. 5. Statement of Judge Hobgood appears at 5B, col. 6.
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The first of these is what might be called a talisman, or placebo, effect.
The effect might not be on the jurors but on the lawyers. Any trial, but espe-
cially a big one, has elements of a major psychological struggle between the
two adversary teams. If one side thinks it has a new weapon, its spirits are
boosted. This increase in morale could result in a more diligent search for
evidence, a more vigorous cross-examination of witnesses, or a more confi-
dent and forceful closing argument than would otherwise have occurred. The
sight of all those experts advising their opponents could have a dispiriting
effect upon the other side as well.
The second possibility is that the effect might be upon individual jury
members for reasons that have little to do with their psychological and de-
mographic backgrounds. The prosecution in the Little trial, and in all of the
trials in which we have participated, took pains to let prospective jurors know
that we were there to "psychoanalyze" them or to use a "Ouija board" to find
the right jurors. The prosecution was obviously hoping to create a state of
psychological reactance 55 that would produce a boomerang or backlash
against us. In fact, this tactic might have produced an effect reinforcing our
efforts. Regardless of their backgrounds, the knowledge that they were cho-
sen by "experts" for their ability to give the defendant a fair trial might have
produced a special bond between the jurors and the defense, hence produc-
ing the outcome sought by the defense in the same manner that "demand
characteristics156 and "Hawthorne effects ' 57 predetermine the outcome of psy-
chological experiments when the participants in the experiment know that
they are being observed.
A third possible alternative hypothesis is that the jury's group cohesiveness
was increased. In the many, many laboratory experiments on group dynamics,
the principal method of creating a high level of cohesiveness is to inform the
members of a group that they have been especially chosen because they have
some desired attribute or characteristic in common with one another. 58 In this
instance the common attribute might be fairmindedness or political or racial
55. Psychological reactance is the tendency to attempt to assert one's independence and "free
will" by acting (or reacting) in a fashion opposite to that desired byv the manipulator whenever a
person feels manipulated by someone or some situation. J. BREHM, RESPONSES TO Loss OF FREE-
DOM: A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE (1972).
56. Demand characteristics are those aspects of situations, especially "scientific " research situ-
ations, which pressure or "demand" a person either to do something in order not to be thought
odd, or to act contrary to the way that "science" predicts that he or she should behave. McCona-
hay, supra note 12, at 381.
57. Hawthorne effects are a special form of behavior in conformity to the demand charac-
teristics of a situation. See note 56 supra. For a discussion of Hawthorne effects, see Kraut &
McConahay, How Being Interviewed Affects Voting: An Experiment, 37 PUB. OPINION Q. 398, 406
(1973). See also McConahay, supra note 12. at 367.
58. Collins & Raven, Group Structure: Attraction, Coalitions, Communication, and Power, in 4 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 102, 119 (2d ed. G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 1969). See also I.
JAN1S, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK (1972).
Page 205: Winter 1977]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
attitudes. The group dynamics research literature suggests that if cohesiveness
is increased in this fashion, the increased use of scientific jury selection by one
side or the other will have two main effects. First, there will be a decrease in
hung juries due to the increase in conformity pressures within the jury.5 1
Second, there will be a greater likelihood that the direction of the final verdict
would reflect whatever trends there were in the first few rounds of jury de-
liberation. Hence, this technique should be used sparingly in situations where
the lawyers are hoping for one or two people to hang the jury or convince the
majority to go with their side.
There are also a number of sound reasons to expect that scientific jury
selection does work and that it does so because of the composition of the
resulting jury. Our own, unscientific poll of the trial lawyers we know resulted
in the following estimate: that 85 per cent of all criminal trials are decided on
the basis of the evidence while 15 per cent are influenced to some extent by
the jurors' biases. In political and other controversial trials, however, this ratio
may be closer to fifty-fifty. More important is the long tradition of research
into the effects of attitudes upon perceptions and decisions. 0 It is a well-
established finding of this research that, although attitudes are not the only
determinant of the person's decision, they are a major influence that increases
in power as the emotions and attitudes of the decision maker become more
extreme and the evidence becomes more ambiguous. However, the most im-
portant reason for suspecting that scientific jury selection is effective is the
string of acquittals and hung juries in which it has been used. The odds are
less than four in 100,000 that such a string of outcomes could have occurred
by chance.6 '
The issue of the effectiveness of scientific jury selection can only be settled
by empirical research. This research will not be easy to carry out. For exam-
ple, while we interviewed both the jurors and a random sample of the persons
we rejected as jurors for Joan Little, the jurors were much more likely than
the non-jurors to be convinced that the defendant was not guilty; moreover,
the non-jurors did not hear the evidence nor did they have the pressures on
them to stick by a not guilty verdict. The problems involved in performing
field research on actual trials are the same problems that are faced by anyone
59. Id.
60. The studies showing this effect are legion. See, e.g., S. AsCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952);
R. ASHMORE & J. MCCONAHAY, supra note 19, at 1-11; M. SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL
NORMS (1936); Ashmore, Prejudice: Causes and Cures, in B. COLLINS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 243-339
(1970); Hastorf & Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study. 49 J. ABNORMAL & SOCIAL PSYCH. 129
(1954); Mitchell & Byrne, supra note 50.
61. Based Upon the assumption that in each of the fifteen trials where we know these tech-
niq(juCs were Used, it was equally likely that the defendants could have been acCuittCd or con-
victed, i.e.. (.50). 5: If the probability of conviction was greater than fiftV-fifty, say .75, then the
likelihood of this string of acquittals occurring by chance is even lower.
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attempting to evaluate a selection or screening technique, whether it is for
admission to a graduate school or a mental hospital. Since the researchers
cannot ethically admit candidates at random to the program, hospital, or jury,
the persons chosen are already extreme on the dimension or dimensions of
interest introducing the problem of regression effects.6 2 Furthermore, the
chosen people differ crucially from those screened out in their subsequent
experiences. Rigorous field work could be done in this area, but it would be
very time consuming and expensive."
It would probably be best, therefore, to start with a series of laboratory
experiments using simulated juries and carefully constructed, fictitious cases.
If the results of these studies in a controlled situation prove suggestive, then
we could move on to more elaborate and expensive field research.
CONCLUSION
We have discussed three uses of social science in the criminal process: 1)
to challenge grand jury composition; 2) to provide evidence for a change of
venue; and 3) to choose jurors. Of these three, only scientific jury selection has
aroused any opposition in popular and semi-scholarly literature. We think that
most of the opposition is based upon a naive understanding of both the
theory and actual practice of the American adversary system of criminal jus-
tice, and that it is too early to make any definitive policy recommendations
until more research has been done to examine if and why scientific jury selec-
tion affects the outcome of jury decisions.
This is not to imply, however, that we are sanguine about the use of scien-
tific jury selection. We are concerned about the potential psychological dam-
62. There is sorne error in any measurement or selection reChi(lue. Persons who are extieme
(either very high or very low) the first ime these techniques are applied (as during the sor dire)
were made extreme. in part because the errors "pushed" them awas fron the mean. Ili a seconrd
measurement, as when evaluating the technique. the errors in the First Ineasurenrent will be re-
placed by a second set of errors which, on the average, will make the persons who were extreme
the first time less extreme the second. Hence, they will have "fallen back" or regressed toward the
mean. This makes it almost impossible to evaluate rigorously a selection technique without it
random coltrol group, see note 53 supra, or Htier(OtiS cases or bioth. Since tIhereC is llo control
group anill ny a snall nullher of cases, a rigorotis evaluatiot of .nsl\ Ole instUnce O[+ scientific
jury selection is impossible. For detailed discussions of regression effects, see I). CAMPI'BELL & J.
STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAI DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH tt (1966): Mc-
Conahay, supra note 12, at 365.
63. An "ethical" experimental studs' would require at least three groups of fifteen jury trials
each. The trials would be assigned randomly to groups. McConahay, supra note 12. at 369. In the
first group, the experts would select the best jury possible using their techniques. In the second
group of trials, the jury experts would simply reinforce the selections that the clients' lawyers
would have made anyway. In the third group, the outcome of the trials with no jury selection
experts involved would be noted and recorded. This last group would thus ser'e as the baseline
control for the outcome of trials in that jurisdiction. This experiment, while methodologicallx
elegant and rigorous, would be very expensive since it would have to be financed by persons
other than the clients. Further, it might still be considered unethical by some observers.
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age to those persons called for jury service and then rejected as jurors by a
team of social scientists which includes psychologists. We cannot be certain
how great this potential is, but we do have evidence which suggests that being
called for jury duty, interviewed extensively, and rejected was not a pleasant
experience for Ms. Little's potential jurors. For example, though virtually all
of the sixteen jurors who heard the case were willing and eager to talk with
our follow-up interviewers, most of the rejected jurors refused to be inter-
viewed. Those who did consent expressed negative feelings toward the ex-
perience and a desire to forget the whole thing. Without a control group we
cannot ascertain whether all potential jurors who are rejected react the same
way. Further research into this question is needed.
We also are concerned, with Etzioni and others, that the use of these ex-
pensive techniques will magnify the already huge disparity between the qual-
ity of defense available to the rich and well-connected, and that available to
the poor and marginal.
Moreover, routine use of these techniques hy both prosecution and de-
fense may simply cause each side to cancel the other out while raising the cost
of a jury trial to both. Thus, we may raise the status quo ante in a system of
justice that is already very expensive to both sides.
Finally, though we would rather see some guilty defendants acquitted than
have innocent defendants convicted, we are concerned that the techniques
could result in the acquittal of persons who were guilty. The fact that the
present authors have maintained their own moral purity by never working
for persons who seemed to us clearly guilty of the crime with which they were
charged does not lessen our concern in this regard.
Because of these concerns, we think that more research is necessary before
we can recommend any policies intended to change the existing sy stem. The
policy recommendations that have been made, especially Etzioni's 6 4 are
64. Etzioni, supra note 36, has made four policy recommendations intended to curb the use of
scientific jury selection. First he suggests decreasing the number of grounds for excuse from jury
duty and increasing the number of persons called for jury duty in order to make a more rep-
resentative universe from which jurors are selected. We would applaud this, but do not see how it
will curb the use of scientific jury selection. Second, he recommends reducing the number of
challenges, especially "preemptory" challenges. We would oppose this if he wants to reduce the
right to challenge for the constitutionally guaranteed causes such as a presumption of innocence.
Furthermore, reducing the number of peremptory challenges may make it even more important
to use scientific selection of jurors. Etzioni's third recommendation is to extend the ban on jury
tampering to all out-of-courtroom investigations of jurors. This is fine with us if it applies to the
FBI and local police as well, but it still would have had no effect on what we did for Joan Little
because we did not investigate the jurors outside the courtroom. We observed them inside the
courtroom and compared them to data gathered on the population as a whole.
Etzioni's final recommendation reveals that he has not had much experience in actual court-
rooms or jury trials. He suggests that only judges be allowed to question and remove prospective
jurors. What is interesting here is that he is recommending what is already done in the federal
courts, and it was in the federal courts that scientific jury selection originated and achieved some
of its must startling successes.
[Vol. 41: No. I
Page 205: Winter 1977] SOCIAL SCIENCE IN TRIALS 229
either beside the point in the existing adversary system or premature. Only
further research can pinpoint what, if any, effects have resulted from this
intrusion of social scientists and social science into the judicial process. We
predict that there will be ample opportunity for such research as these tech-
niques are used increasingly over the next few years.
